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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID F. TIBBETTS,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 880063-CA

SUZANNE DANDOY, In Her
Capacity as Executive
Director of the Utah
Department of Health,

Category No. 14 a

Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth
District Court granting summary judgment to the respondent
and denying summary judgment to petitioner.

(Record, at 93)

(hereinafter referred to as "R") The action in the district
court was commenced pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2
(1953) and sought review of a final determination by the
Executive Director of the Department of Health denying
petitioner Medicaid assistance.

1

(R-l)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether respondent erred as a matter of law in
finding that petitioner's home was not exempt as an asset
under the Medicaid statute?
2.

Whether respondent should be equitably

estopped from denying petitioner Medicaid?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
•

The following relevant sources are reproduced in
the addendum section:
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3)
APA Vol. Ill § 411.1
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(B)
42 C.F.R. §§ 435.812-.814
42 C.F.R. §§ 435.840-.843

STATEMENT OF THE CA$E
This is a review of final agency action by the
Department of Health upholding a denial of Medicaid benefits
to petitioner.

(R-18) Petitioner originally sought review

in the district court which issued an order on November 25,
1987, upholding respondent's action.

(R-93) Petitioner

seeks review of that order in the Court of Appeals.

(R-106)

During December, 1985, petitioner applied for
retroactive Medicaid benefits to cover the cost of dental
care needed by his four children. (R-34) Petitioner was
2

advised by caseworkers in respondent's Provo office that his
children were eligible for Medicaid for the month of December and that he should go ahead and obtain the necessary
treatment. (R-2Q, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39) Although petitioner
requested Medicaid coverage, his application was not filed
until January 3, 1986.

(R-33-34) Petitioner paid $87.35 as

a medical excess for the month of

December, since his

countable income exceeded the basic maintenance standard for
a family of his size.

After the dental treatment had been

provided, a second caseworker reviewed petitioner's Medicaid
file on or about March 26, 1986, and concluded that he was
not eligible because of excess assets.

(R-32) The asset

which allegedly rendered petitioner ineligible for Medicaid
was a six and one-half acre portion of a lot owned by him in
Genola, Utah.

(R-36-38) At the time of his application,

petitioner owned an eight acre lot in Genola over which a
dirt path existed.

(R-4-5) The path was used by the city

of Genola to reach a water tower located to the rear of
petitioner's property.

(R-5) The path divided the eight

acre plot into six and one-half acres on one side and one
and one-half acres on the other.

(R-4-5)

A medical excess payment must be paid under Utah's medically needy
program whenever an applicant's household income exceeds the standard
set by the state. See discussion, infra, at 5.

3

The second caseworker determined that because of
the excess assets, petitioner was not eligible for Medicaid
in December, 1985, and returned the spenddown to him.
(R-34) Respondent refused Medicaid coverage of the December
dental treatment.

Petitioner then requested a hearing which

was held on April 9, 1986, before Fair Hearing Officer Neal
Bernson.

(R-31) Petitioner was unrepresented by legal

counsel at the hearing.

(R-31) Officer Bernson issued a

recommended decision on July 31, 1986, finding that petitionees Medicaid application for December, 1985, had been
properly denied.

(R-19) On or about August 7, 1986, the

respondent, Executive Director Suzanne Dandoy, adopted the
hearing officer's recommendation.

(R-18) The review in the

district court followed that decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3), the
district court reviewed the final agency action under the
following standard:
"If the final determination of the executive
director is consistent with the findings of fact
and conclusions of law recommended by the hearing
officer, the court shall review the record and may
alter the final determination only upon a finding
that the final determination is capricious, or not
supported by the evidence."
This court has held that an appeal from a district court
which has reviewed an administrative decision is reviewed
just as if the appeal had come directly from the agency.

4

TechnoMedical Labs v. Securities Division, 744 P.2d 320, 321
n.l (Ut. App. 1987) The court further noted that the
standard of review applicable to such reviews is that of
"reasonableness or rationality."

Id*, at 323. The court

noted:
Under this standard, the agency's decision will be
set aside 'only if it is outside the tolerable
limits of reason1 or fso unreasonable that it must
be deemed capricious and arbitrary.' Id., at 323.
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that when an appellate court reviews an agency decision, an intervening court
decision is entitled to no presumption of correctness, since
the lower court did not have a more advantaged position for
reviewing the administrative record.

Bennion v. Utah State

Board of Oil, Gas and Minerals, 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Ut.
1983)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the federal Medicaid program, an applicant's
home is excluded as an exempt resource. Respondent is bound
by the federal regulations and must make a reasonable
application to individual cases. Respondent interprets the
federal regulation as exempting a home and an average size
lot in the community where it is located.

Respondent has

erred in petitioner's case by finding that a path or trail
across petitioner's property legally divided his property,
leaving a parcel of land that must be sold.

Substantial

evidence is lacking for the finding that petitioner owned
5

two parcels of land, one of which is subject to sale.
Respondent's application of the regulation and her own
policies and procedures is unreasonable in petitioner's
case.
Respondent, through her representative caseworkers
in the Provo 0C0 office, represented to petitioner that his
children were eligible for Medicaid during December, 1985.
Petitioner relied on those representations and had certain
dental work performed.

Subsequently, respondent's represen-

tatives disavowed their earlier statements and declared
petitioner ineligible because of excess assets. Petitioner
has relied to his detriment and respondent should be equitably estopped from denying him Medicaid benefits.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The District Court Erred As a Matter of Law In
Finding That Petitioner's Home Was Not An Exempt
Asset Under The Medicaid Statute.
The Medicaid program was established by Congress
in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The
program, which is designed to provide federal financial
assistance to those states choosing to reimburse needy
persons for certain medical treatment costs, is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

Individual states are not required

to participate in Medicaid, but once they decide to do so,
they must comply with federal law. Townsend v. Swank, 404

6

U*S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502 (1971)

If a state chooses to

participate in the Medicaid program, the federal government
will reimburse the state for a portion of the cost. 42
U.S.C. § 1396b

In Utah, approximately seventy percent of

the Medicaid budget is supplied by the federal participant.
Medicaid does not provide assistance to every poor
person in need. The program is intentionally designed to
provide a health benefit component linked to other financial
assistance programs. For example, persons qualifying for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are considered "categorically needy" and are thereby mandatorally
eligible for Medicaid.

42 U.S.C-. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (i); 42

C.F.R. § 435.100 et seq.

An optional category of eligibili-

ty, which is the category at issue in this case, is "medically needy".

This classification includes those who have

income or resources above the limits for AFDC but below the
state-established "medically needy" limit and who meet all
other non-eligibility criteria for AFDC. Thus, medically
needy recipients include persons who are AFDC-like (needy
children and their parents) and who have income and resources within the applicable limits.
1396a(a)(10)(C)

42 U.S.C. §

Utah has opted to cover this group of

individuals and frequently requires payment of a spenddown
or, the amount by which income exceeds the basic maintenance
standard, if the applicant's household income exceeds the
established standard of need for a household of that size.

7

In this case, petitioner's children qualified as medically
needy children and petitioner was required to pay a
spenddown in order to receive Medicaid coverage for December, 1985.
The federal regulations implement the statutory
authority for extending Medicaid to medically needy individuals.

42 C.F.R. § 435.300 et seq. The regulations provide

that a state Medicaid agency may provid^ Medicaid to individuals who have income that meets the standards set forth
in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.812-.814 or, if their income exceeds
these standards, allow eligibility if the incurred medical
expenses equal the difference between countable income and
the applicable income standard.

Persons qualifying for

medically needy coverage must also meet the applicable
resource standards in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.840-.843.
The applicable medically needy resource standards
require that eligibility be determined using a resource
standard that is based on family size, is uniform for all
individuals and is reasonable.

42 C.F.R. § 435.840. A

medically needy resource standard is presumed to be reasonable if it equals the highest resource standard for the cash
assistance group or program related to the covered medically
needy group.

In this case, petitioner's family is properly

classifiable as related to the AFDC cash assistance group.
Therefore, the AFDC resource standards are applicable to
petitioner's case.

8

The applicable AFDC resource standards are found
at 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a)(3)(B) and provide in relevant
part:
A State Plan ... must ... [s]pecify ... in
AFDC—The amount of real and personal property
that can be reserved for each assistance unit
shall not be in excess of one thousand dollars
equity value (or such lesser amount as the State
specifies in its State plan) excluding only:
(1) The home which is the usual residence of the
assistance unit;
*• •«

The state of Utah implements the federal regulations through its local Office of Community Operations (OCO)
offices.

To aid the local offices, state authorities

publish volumes of policies and procedures which are to
guide caseworkers in applying the federal statute and
regulations.

In this case, respondents promulgated APA Vol*

III § 411.1, which provides in relevant part:
1. One Home and Lot - All Cases
Exclude one home...and lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the client.
a. The lot on which the home stands shall not
exceed the average size of residential lots in the
community where it is. Count the equity value of
property exceeding the average size lot*
It was this section of respondent's rules that the
caseworker applied in March, 1986, in finding that petitioner had excess resources for the medically needy program.

Although a state participating in the Medicaid
program is permitted to make eligibility determinations, the

9

Issue of AFDr'eligibility, and i n thi s case Medicaid eligit imate] ;y a qi le st i 01 1 • ::)f federal law. Herndoi i v.
..'cicrado, 528 p.2d 395 (Colo. App, 1 974)

The state of Utah

. : permittee* to adopt polici es and procedures such as APA
1.1 , but the i u les adopted must be reasonable
and ree.

n derogation of the federal statute.

Rosen v.

Hursh, i:° T Supp. 322, 324 (D. Minn* 1971) rev'd on other
grounds,

*

F 2d 731

Moreover, the state Medi caia partic-

ipant has an affirmative duty to sho\ / the reasonableness of
1^3 roli~i e • ...

Amos v. Dept

of Health and Resources, 444

.-..<. App. 1983)
:o should first i:e noted that teo applicable

federal recnr -J - ~ • -. •/J**, milt

it

i;w!.»v, i!i ^ *

*-\-

* ~ ^\

oj.t-v-t.,1^^-^.

i * Liu

' ,v. ..

*.tii\l

' iv'OIaMx-

s i z e " a r e n o t d e f i n e d ie :ie federal recr . ' ation.- , The

Jteacrai regulations whj.cn u\^3i LL r e a s o n a b l e . i it , - \ .
survive judicial scruciii .

UL^^

^

'ijreover, t h e state's policies

..^.. applicable,.,

th.s e a s e , -he s*-<±te ui Li ah

tailed :e * r ^ responsibility to r e a s o n a b l y

ippi^ the f e d e r a l

u^ ^pp-iror.: r ^ -n i ^ w e w i n g r h e transcript of
p e t i t i o n e r ' s c a s e , that t h e casework t involved reel let ex
ini n«'*M*1 i i he T: iii :i i: id tha t: t h e '

i

-

t h e r e b y e f f e c t i n g a legal d i v i s i o n u: ::..:> property into

,

separate parcels, one of which qualified as a lot connected
with his home and the other a parcel subject to sale. At
one point the caseworker even referred to the one parcel as
being "across the street."

(R-35)

Absent from the record,

however, is any evidence of a route established across
petitioner's property which could be classified as a legal
road or some other dividing line having legal status.
Petitioner testified that the route was more on the order of
a path or trail, was not blacktopped or maintained by the
city of Genola and did not appear on an official plat of the
city.

(R-4-5, 46)

It appears that the road is no more than

a vestige of the city's infrequent passage over petitioner's
property which mushroomed in the caseworker's mind until it
attained legal status, despite the lack of any reference to
an easement or right-of-way on the city plat.

(R-46) Were

the caseworker's concept of property division to apply in
all cases, a footpath developed by school children across a
Medicaid recipient's property could in time result in
Medicaid disqualification, since the passage of little feet
could establish a "road" just as surely as the infrequent
crossing of city vehicles operated by the City of Genola.
If the respondent is correct, a farmer's property divided by
a cowpath could disqualify him from Medicaid.

Such results

would hardly be considered reasonable.
In addressing the issue of home exemption, respondent ignored her own policies which provide that a lot is
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excluded if It does n - "ox^ecd the weraqe siz e: residen1 lal lots :i 1:1 the

•-

...-

.-..,.. i

through introduction cf the piat tna ~ nis let 1.. indeed an
average size lot fe? tho re^^uni'y c
. , <-.

Genola, Utah.

(R-46)

•

others

che piat snov;3 tiiar it .j smallei en^n tne majority of
the properties contained therein.
; *.;i .;,i..-

rid J cal Ltiij Liu1 Ihe UJL owned by

. •. . -.

petitioner is net subdivided is the eity piat introduced at
the hearing .

- p . * ^ "-.-.

. ...i <• .

show?* petitioner- bavin 1 loaal

:

J: J-.-..

^cie ;

L.

••:.:• eiouciesorre

path ci ; roac" is not even entered on the ciat nap,
• ioner';- Ioa?,l description
•,,... e^.

. ,.-. .

Pcti -

as stated, in a recent tax

.:c2i':'.i.'.: _.; in easement or right-of-way

over nis lot and shows rxiir ~-s owning an undivided interest
• • '•* , ' * acres.

(R-70)

1 which the pat.

The , ret itioner o\ m s al 1 of t .he
;• . sses .-.no a is evidence of owner-

ship outweighs any supposed division created by the
caseworker.
E vei 1 assuming that five acres u- the average size
lor fe: Genola (which the plat shows is net the case),,
oetltioncr! s ownership —
* . i..

eje^er 1 1

. .i.

v eight acre lot does not a 1 i/to~
, ... ie for Medicaid.

Instead,

respondent *-;~ regulations provide that only the equity of the
excess rropertv exceeding the average si ze :i s coi mted
t.... J

Ii 1

, .... Hi...ce. exceeding the average size lot for the
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City of Genola would have questionable equity value, since
it would be less than the minimum size lot required by the
city.

Moreover, such excess would be restricted in access

to irrigation water and would have limited agricultural
value.

Clearly, the record does not contain substantial

evidence of the equity value of property belonging to
petitioner, regardless of how it is divided.

POINT II
Respondents Should Be Equitably Estopped From
Denying Petitioner Medicaid Benefits.
A further issue which arises in petitioner's case
is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply
so as to estop respondent from denying petitioner Medicaid
benefits.

It is evident from a review of petitioner's

hearing transcript that he considered himself misled by
caseworkers in the Provo OCO office concerning his Medicaid
eligibility.

He testified without contradiction that he was

told by caseworkers that his children would be eligible for
Medicaid benefits during the month of December and he should
go ahead and have the necessary dental work performed.
(R-31, 33, 34, 38, 39,) Based on the representations by
respondent's representatives in the Provo OCO office,
petitioner proceeded to have the dental care performed for
his children.

He testified that he even received a letter

stating that he had been approved for Medicaid during the
month of December. (R-33) Petitioner testified that he did
13

not fail to disclose t-ru* property w\ ; o -

•- '-he subject of;

t1 * ^ -:\ r<\-\

.

ty.

-

J

:

-

.*

>' . ~*^ i'

.

.„; proper-

.'jstifled m a t re relied c:. the
F

representation that h^ naci coon approved
a 's;.s\..

. os^i. .

or Medicaid

.

**_•..: ;\;C^, he

would not have had the dental work performed.

(R-4U)

The

hearing examiner I n his findings of fact concluded:
He called the district office, explained his
circumstances and was informed that his children
Id qualify for dental work that needed to be
Therefore, he had the dental work done a- *
d for Medical Assistance in January,, 198<
he was advised t<i. :Ie was even told how much ij
~ — *- income to pay which he did on January t t
If he is not eligible new based upon excess
, then he can understand why he would be
LiiCij-gible for ongoing assistance. l\h"\ however,
feels that because of the mistake of the district
office in approving him in error, that the payment
to the dentist should be made i n behalf of his
children.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel \^ weil established

• ''' : • • :: ; srsr*. lor - - . lr

.udii Liquo: lontro^ commission, ^\Z
the court observed thar

__ y ^

Jd '&%. b-v *'"

1979)

equitable es:oppo. jnay be applied

against the state ever wher : - :
s..*- .

Ce .ebr^ >.J ^1.^ > , _._

. .jcessai

\.

r

ic * -

r revent

*

:;.^;IILOCS*

ntai

injustice

and th:; exercise oL governmental powers <;.fcl no- ce Impaired
ther^b-*
^•Lvr^a,

ioe West. v. Department of . .•cia. .,:;i ..a.',.
*h"i I-, h; "•: '*

! - Wash. 1 '""h^ -

.ur the essential elements

he I1 ^n ~ , v4_

~~^

f equitable estoppel as follows:

(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of
such admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.
Id., at 694.
In Utah State University v. Sutro & Company, 646
P.2d 715 (Ut. 1982) the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the long
history of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and reiterated
its holding that "estoppel should be allowed as a defense
against the government where to do otherwise would work a
serious injustice, and the public interest would not be
unduly damaged by the interposition of that defense."

Id.,

at 719. The court cited with approval the decision in
United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (1975) wherein:
The court noted the precaution that not every form
of official misinformation would be sufficient to
estop the government, but where advice given was
so closely related to basic fairness and the
decision-making process, the government should be
estopped from disavowing the representation made
because to do so would work a serious injustice on
the defendant and the interest of the public would
not be unduly threatened or damaged.
Utah State University v. Sutro & Company, supra, at 720.
The court concluded:
We regard the authorities referred to above as
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is
in harmony, and supportive of the well-recognized
policy of the law as earlier set forth herein, to
the effect that the rule which precludes the
assertion of estoppel against the government is
sound and generally should be applied, except only
in appropriate circumstances as hereinabove
stated, where the interests of justice mandate an
exception to that general rule. In cases where
15

such a n issue a r i s e s , t h e critical inquiry is
ther it appears that t h e facts m a y b e found
A such certainty, and t h e injustice t o b e
fered is of sufficient gravity, t o invoke the
exception. A n d in case there is doubt o n such
m a t t e r s , it should b e resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a trial of t h e issue, a s
opposed, to summary rejection thereof.
Utah State University v. :i\r:ro
Several coui ts

u Company, : supra. ^t ' /*

- :*hci

* :: iscict.ions ^ i n : : ; ;:.:^s

region have applied t h e doctrine 01 aquirable estoppel in
the context of public entit 1 emenr ^

,

- Graver

F am i ly S e 1 v i c e s I) i v i s i 01 1, - : :.•..- .

*. Aciu • \. and

, C; , hpr:

1 ~" tr.o

court held that equitable estoppel c nil-i apply - ;: t;.». ;ase
of a Medicaid recipient whc had b e e n advised r s ~'
children were eligible tor dental coverage a ^ : *.*c iic-i n o f
b e e n informed of the /ocd 1 >r prior luthorization. T i e
court held that- ;•
believed, a case

*':>-•'

-

-

-,-^e . n e

. estopping t;Au u jo.noi iiom applying its

rules h a d been presented.
Fi lipo
^.ih^l-?'
"

Id,, at -l *'**. Similarly, in.
:

the Hawaii Social Serviwe:b ^gcAcj

:>: :

" ^

to.--in asserting the inva-

lidity of certain welfare regulation:* when the agency's o w n
misfeasance ana nonteasancrnoncum, _aiice,

Id. , -v

*-

-

1

fn

... court oDservcc:

Government, above all, must oe *'.bovc reproach.
Equity and fairness dictate tha1' it should not be
permitted to take advantage of its o w n wrong or
mistake. R. EL Stearns Co. v. United States, 291
U.S. 5 4 , 54 S.Ct. 325, 78 L.Ed. 647 (1934). A
citizen h a s a., right to expect the same standard of
honesty, justice and fair dealing in h i s contact
wi th the State or other political entity, which he
i s ] e g a J i v ^-r.--rded i n ^ > ^ d^ali ngs wi t h o t h e r

individuals. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash.2d 161,
433 P.2d 833 (1968).
Id., at 300.
For the same reasons set forth in the above-cited
case law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be
applied in this case.

Petitioner dealt honestly with

respondent in attempting to obtain Medicaid coverage for his
children's dental needs. He testified repeatedly and
without contradiction that he had b€*en told by Medicaid
caseworkers in the Provo office that his children were
eligible for Medicaid and he should go ahead with the dental
work.

It is clear that he relied to his detriment on a

representation by respondent that the service would be
covered.

It was not until three months after the represen-

tation that respondent disavowed her earlier statement. A
manifest injustice would result unless respondent is
estopped from denying eligibility.

The public interest

would be well served by such a holding, since it would
promote confidence in the social service system operated by
the state of Utah.

In comparison with the state's overall

budget, the amount in question is likely small. The sense
of fairness and prevention of injustice to a vulnerable
individual would accrue to the state and the public as a
lasting value.
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CONCLUSION

for Medicaid during Decembe:, ±$b-?> -ecauso tnc aonne to was
living \:\ was exemiy

r,

he 1 or o' which rh^ hcrc^ w*r

'-••'•xis;

... tj.

lot. I.JL :.ne community where no 1- voc:

• :

; t_

*:^*•-

. ,

Respondent nas failed

to establish tha*" petitioner owned a separate rarco".

*

and

of petitioner was an unreasonable application -. i the federal
statute -ind regulations,
.t>

• ,-2>

Moreover. : esponden* r u ^

. • oin de;i_, .ny pc:::ioner Medicare, w .ujp

net own representations caused him t: acv
For these reason*:
-i.-

~o his detriment.

petitioner recruests that " V •
-

.

:.A.sti,c: court anc c.,^c^ ,. rs

order requiring respondent to award r.im Medicaid benefits
for the month of December, 1985.
DATED this

'f

day of

/ 6vyut

, 1Q?Q

MICHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney for Petitioner
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name of the department at any time and place, in
accordance with rules and procedures for administrative hearings adopted by the department. Minutes
or a summary of the proceeding of such hearing
shall be taken and filed with the department
records, together with recommended findings of fact
and conclusions of law made by the hearing officer,
from which the executive director shall make a final
determination. In any such hearing, the hearing
officer shall' have authority to administer oaths,
examine witnesses, and issue in the name of the
department notice of the hearings or subpoenas
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence relevant to any matter in the
hearing. Hearings shall be conducted in a manner
which guarantees the parties' due process rights.
This includes, but is not limited to, the right to
exarriine any evidence presented to the department
or hearing officer, the right to cross-examine any
witness, and a prohibition of ex parte communication between any party and a member of the committee or the hearing officer. Final rules incorporating these procedures shall be adopted by the committee on or before October 1,1988.
(2) Judicial review of a final determination of the
executive director may be secured by the aggrieved
party by filing a petition in the district court within
30 days after receipt of notice of the executive director's final determination. The petition, which
shall be served upon the executive director, shall
state the grounds upon which review is sought. With
his answer, the executive director shall certify and
file with the court all documents and papers and a
transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with the recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the hearing officer, and the
final determination of the executive director." "
(3) If the final determination of the executive
director is consistent with the findings of fact and
conclusions of law recommended by the hearing
officer, the court shall review the record and may
alter the final determination only upon a finding
that the final determination is capricious, or hot
supported by the evidence.
' ln
t *>
(4) If the final determination of the executive
director is not consistent with the findings of fact
and conclusions of law recommended by the hearing
officer, the executive director shall prepare and file
with the court at the time of filing the answer to the
petition, findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support the final determination of the executive
director. The petitioner shall have 15 days after
receipt of the executive director's findings of fact
and conclusions of law to amend the petition for
review. The court may affirm or amend the final
determination of the executive director, or require
further or additional testimony necessary to be
taken, and issue an order based on its own findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
-« ? j tv \7 «< "~' 1*87
26-23-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). T .
Administrative review of actions of department or
director.

-

^

Any person aggrieved by any action or inaction of
the department or its executive director may request
agency action and appropriate adjudicative proceedings. Hearings shall be conducted in a manner
which guarantees the parties' due process rights.
This includes, but is not limited to, the right to
examine any evidence presented to the department
or hearing officer, the right to cross-examine any
witness, and a prohibition of ex parte communication between any party and a member of the com828
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mittee or the hearing officer. Final rules incorporating these procedures shall be adopted by,the committee on or before October 1,1988. ^ n n-M 19S7
26-23-3. Violation of public health laws or orders, r h
unlawful.
* « i' » " r /r 3?"f <M
It shall be unlawful for any person, association,
or corporation, and the officers thereof: ' » * ^•**1
(1) to willfully violate, disobey, or disregard the
provisions of the public health laws or the terms of
any lawful notice, order, standard, rule, or regular
tion issued thereunder; or /*'
» »n-i * **••*«.
(2) to fail to remove or abate from private property under the person's control at his own expense,
within 48 hours, or such other reasonable time as
the health authorities shall determine, after being
ordered to do so by the health authorities, any nuisance, source of filth, • cause of sickness, dead
animal, health hazard, or sanitation violation within
the jurisdiction and control of the department,
whether the person, association, or corporation shall
be the owner, tenant, or occupant of such property;
provided, however, when any such condition is due
to an act of God, it shall be removed at public
expense; or
,
, i ,
(3) to pay, give, present, or otherwise convey to
any officer or employee of the department any gift,
remuneration or other consideration, directly or
indirectly, which such officer or employee is forbidden to receive by the provisions of this chapter.
(4) to fail to make or file reports required by law
or rule of the department relating to the existence of
disease or other facts and ^statistics relating to the
public health.
'
''
, ,\*'mi
26-23-4. Unlawful acts by department officers \,, f „ r
and employees.
'
_
;
It shall be unlawful, for any officer or„ employee
of the department:
'
' \ tf ,
(1) To accept any gift, remuneration, or other
consideration, directly or indirectly \, for an incorrect or improper performance of the duties imposed
upon him by or in behalf of the department or by
the provisions of this chapter. ' ~*
' - -» * —
(2) To perform any work, labor, or services other
than the duties assigned to him on behalf of the
department during the hours such officer or employee is regularly employed by the department, or to
perform his duties as an officer or employee of the
department under any condition or arrangement that
involves a violation of this or any other law j>f the
state. '
r > * > . •* " ' '" ' m i
26-23-5. Unlawful acts concerning certificates, n ;'
' records and reports - Unlawful transportation or
x
acceptance of dead human body.
'* ' 3
It shall be unlawful for any person, association,
or corporation and the officers thereof:' s i
,
(1) to willfully and knowingly make any false
statement in a certificate, record, or report required
to be filed with the department, or in an application
for a certified copy of a vital record, or to willfully
and knowingly supply false information intending
that such information be used in the preparation of
any such report, record, or certificate or amendment
thereof;
* r" ' < " : ^
' (2) to make, counterfeit* alter, amend, or mutilate
any certificate, record, or report required to be filed
under this code or a certified copy of such certificate, record, or report without lawful authority and
with the intent to deceive;
„' >
5»
(3) to willfully and knowingly obtain, possess,
use, sell, furnish, or attempt to obtain, possess, use,
sell, or furnish to another,, for any purpose of dec• C o ' s Annotation Service

Utah Code Ann. § 26 2 3 - 2 ( 3 )
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411 Exempt Assets
Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases other than
Indigent Medical cases. See Section 807 for exemptions specific to
Indigent Medical cases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use
the F or C policy.
1.

One Home and Lot - All Cases
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and lot owned or being
purchased and occupied by the client.
a.

F and G Cases - The lot on which the home stands shall not
exceed the average size of residential lots in the community
where it is. Count the equity value of property exceeding an
average size lot,

b.

A. B and D Cases - Exempt the home and all contiguous property.
Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the life estate
continues to live in the home.

2.

One Home and Lot of a Person in a Nursine, Home - All Cases
When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a home, becomes a
resident of a nursing home, the home or life estate becomes countable
unless:
a.

The person's stay in the nursing home will be short term. A
stay is short term if a doctor says that the client is likely to
return home within 6 months of admission. Anyone in a nursing
home more than 6 months after admission is long term.

or

b.

The person states that he intends to return home. It does not
matter whether the person actually returns home within 6
months. There is no time limit to this exemption. The
statement of intent must be in writing from the client or his
representative.

or

c.

The person has a spouse, dependent child, or relative* who lives
in the home.

3.

Water Rights - All Cases
Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot.

Relative:

son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter,
in-laws, mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, half-sister,
half-brother, niece, nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt,
uncle, sister, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister
B-87-02-APA
A P A V o l . Ill §

411.1

45 CFR Ch. II (10-1-87 Edition)

§ 233.20
18 years of age or older and permanently and totally disabled.
(3) Federal financial participation is
available in assistance payments made
for the entire month in accordance
with* the State plan if the individual
was eligible for a portion of the
month, provided that the individual
was eligible on the date that the payment was made; except that where it
has been determined that the State
agency had previously denied assistance to which the individual was entitled, Federal financial participation
will be provided in any corrective payment regardless of whether the individual is eligible on the date that the
corrective payment is made.
(4) Federal financial participation is
available in assistance payments
which are continued in accordance
with the State plan, for a temporary
period during which the effects of an
eligibility condition are being overcome, e.g., blindness in AB, disability
in APTD, physical or mental incapacity, continued absence of a parent, or
unemployment of a principal earner I in
AFDC.
J
(5) Where changed circumstances or
a hearing decision makes the individual ineligible for any assistance, or eligible for a smaller amount of assistance than was actually paid, Federal
financial participation is available in
excess payments to such individuals,
for not more than one month following the month in which the circumstances changed or the hearing decision was rendered. Federal financial
participation is available where assistance is required to be continued unadjusted because a hearing has been requested.
(Sec. 1102, Social Security Act, as amended,
49 Stat. 647, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 1302 and
Part XXIII of Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 843)
[36 FR 3866. Feb. 27, 1971, as amended at 38
FR 8744. Apr. 6, 1973; 39 FR 26912, July 24,
1974; 40 FR 32958. Aug. 5, 1975; 47 FR 5674,
Feb. 5, 1982; 47 FR 47828, Oct. 28, 1982; 51
FR 9204, Mar. 18, 1986]
§ 233.20 Need and amount of assistance.
(a) Requirements for State Plans. A
State Plan for OAA, AFDC, AB,
APTD or AABD must, as specified
below:

(1) General (i) Provide that the determination of need and amount of assistance for all applicants and recipients will be made on an objective and
equitable basis and all types of income
will be taken into consideration in the
same way except where otherwise specifically authorized by Federal statute
and
(ii) Provide that individuals receiving SSI benefits under title XVI, for
the period for which such benefits are
received, shall not be included in the
AFDC assistance unit for purposes of
determining need and the amount of
the assistance payment. Under this requirement, "individuals receiving SSI
benefits under title XVI" includes individuals receiving mandatory or optional State supplementary payments
under section 1616(a) of the Act or
under section 212 of Pub. L. 93-66.
(2) Standards of assistance, (i) Specify a statewide standard, expressed in
money amounts, to be used in determining (a) the need of applicants and
recipients and (6) the amount of the
assistance payment.
(ii) In the AFDC plan, provide that
by July 1, 1969, the State's standard of
assistance for the AFDC program will
have been adjusted to reflect fully
changes in living costs since such
standards were established, and any
maximums that the State imposes on
the amount of aid paid to families will
have been proportionately adjusted.
In such adjustment a consolidation of
the standard (i.e., combining of items)
may not result in a reduction in the
content of the standard. In the event
the State is not able to meet need in
full under the adjusted standard, the
State may make ratable reductions in
accordance with paragraph (a)(3)(viii)
of this section. Nevertheless, if a State
maintains a system of dollar maximums these maximums must be proportionately adjusted in relation to
the updated standards.
(iii) Provide that the standard will
be uniformly applied throughout the
State except as provided under
§ 239.54.
(iv) Include the method used in determining need and the amount of the
assistance payment. For AFDC, the
method must provide for rounding
down to the next lower whole dollar

102
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§

233.20(a)(3)(B)

Office of Family Assistance, Fam. Supp. Admin., HHS

§ 233.20

when the result of determining the that can be reserved for each individstandard of need or the payment ual recipient shall not be in excess of
amount is not a whole dollar. Prora- two thousand dollars. Policies may
tion under § 206.10(a)(6)(i)(D) to de- allow reasonable proportions of
termine the amount of payment for income from businesses or farms to be
the month of application must occur used to increase capital assets, so that
before rounding to determine the pay- income may be increased; and (B) in
AFDC—The amount of real and perment amount for that month.
(v) If the State agency includes spe- sonal property that can be reserved
cial need items in its standard, (A) de- for each assistance unit shall not be in
scribe those that will be recognized excess of one thousand dollars equity
and the circumstances under which value (or such lesser amount as the
they will be included, and (B) provide State specifies in its State plan) exthat they will be considered for all ap- cluding only:
(1) The home which is the usual resplicants and recipients requiring them;
except that under AFDC, work ex- idence of the assistance unit;
(2) One automobile, up to $1,500 of
penses and child care (or care of incapacitated adults living in the same equity value or such lower limit as; the
home and receiving AFDC) resulting State may specify in the State plan;
from employment or participation in (any excess equity value must be apeither a CWEP or an employment plied towards the general resource
search program cannot be special limit specified in the State plan);
needs.
(3) One burial plot (as defined in the
(vi) If the State chooses to establish State plan) for each member of the asthe need of the individual on a basis sistance unit;
(4) Bona fide funeral agreements (as
that recognizes, as essential to his
well-being, the presence in the home defined and within limits specified in
of other needy individuals, (a) specify the State plan) up to a total of $1,500
the persons whose needs will be in- of equity value or such lower limit as
cluded in the individual's need, and (6) the State may specify in the State
provide that the decision as to wheth- plan for each member of the assister any individual will be recognized as ance unit;
essential to the recipient's well-being
(5) Real property for a period of six
shall rest with the recipient,
months (or at the option of the State,
(vii) [Reserved]
nine months) which the family is
(viii) Provide that the money making a good faith effort (as defined
amount of any need item included in in the State plan) to sell subject to folthe standard will not be prorated or lowing provisions. The family must
otherwise reduced solely because of sign an agreement to dispose of the
the presence in the household of a property and to repay the amount of
non-legally responsible individual; and aid received during such period that
the agency will not assume any contri- would not have been paid had the
bution from such individual for the property been sold at the beginning of
support of the assistance unit except such period, but not to exceed the
as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(xiv) amount of the net proceeds of the
and (a)(5) of this section and § 233.51 sale. If the property has not been sold
of this part.
within the specified time period, or if
(3) Income and resources, (i) (A) eligibility stops for any other reason,
OAA, AB, APTD, AABD, Specify the the entire amount of aid paid during
amount and types of real and personal such period will be treated as an overproperty, including liquid assets, that payment; and
may be reserved, i.e., retained to meet
(6) At State option, basic maintethe current and future needs while as- nance items essential to day-to-day
sistance is received on a continuing living such as clothes, furniture and
basis. In addition to the home, person- other similarly essential items of limital effects, automobile and income pro- ed value.
ducing property allowed by the
(ii) Provide that in determining need
agency, the amount of real and per- and the amount of the assistance paysonal property, including liquid assets, ment, after all policies governing the

45 C . P . R .
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CALLY NEEDY INCOME STANDARDS

the maximum dollar amount on
income allowed for purposes of FFP
under § 435.1007; and
(2) The lower income standard at
least equals the maximum amount allowed for purposes of FFP.
(d) In the case of an agency that
provides Medicaid for the aged, blind,
or disabled individuals only if they
meet more restrictive requirements
than used under SSI, the following
provisions apply:
(1) The agency may use an income
standard for those individuals that is
lower than the standard specified in
paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) The lower standard must at least
equal the medically needy income
standard for those aged, blind, or disabled individuals under the State's
plan on January 1, 1972.
(e) If the agency uses a medically
needy income standard not specified in
paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section—
(1) That standard is not presumed to
be reasonable; and
C2) HCFA must approve the standard.

11 Medically needy income standIs: General requirements.
letermine eligibility of medically
individuals, a Medicaid agency
use an income standard under
ibpart that is—
lased on family size;
Jniform for all individuals in a
d group;
?or p p p purposes, not in excess
Vb percent of the highest money
>nt that ordinarily would be
in the State APDC program to
ividual or a family of comparae (see § 435.1007); and
Reasonable (see § 435.812).
47987, Sept. 30. 19813
2 Medically needy income standIs: Reasonableness.
'he agency must use a medically
income standard that is reasonThe following medically n^edy
> standards are presumed to be
able:
'he agency provides one medicaldy income standard for all cov[ledically needy groups. Except
vided in paragraphs (c) and (d)
i section, the standard must at
qual the highest income or payitandard used to determine eligiin the cash assistance programs
optional State supplement, if
jency provides Medicaid under
30) related to the covered medieedy groups.
?he agency provides a different
illy needy income standard for
jovered medically needy group.
: as provided in paragraphs (c)
I) of this section, the standard
ch covered group must at least
:he income or payment standard
;o determine eligibility in the
ssistance program (or an optione supplement, if the agency proVledicaid under § 435.230) relatthat covered medically needy
The agency may use a lower
illy needy income standard than
andards specified in paragraph
this section if—
?he income standard used under
aph (b) of this section exceeds

§ 435.821

[46 FR 47987, Sept. 30, 1981]
§435.813 [Reservedl
§435.814 Medically needy income standards: State plan requirements.
(a) The State plan must specify the
income standard for each covered
medically needy group.
(b) If the agency uses an income
standard that is not presumed to be
reasonable under § 435.812, the State
plan must describe that standard.
[46 FR 47987, Sept. 30, 1981]
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
RELATIVES

§435.821 Financial responsibility of relatives: Individuals under age 21 and
caretaker relatives.
(a) The agency must meet the requirements of this section in determining eligibility—
(1) Under §435.308 of medically
needy individuals under age 21; and
(2) Under §435.310 of medically
needy caretaker relatives.

42 C . F . R .

§§

435.812-.814

§ 435.840

42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-85 E

supplement recipients under § 435.230;
or
(iii) The amount of the highest
medically needy income standards for
one
person
established
under
§ 435.814.
(3) For an individual with a family
at home, an additional amount for the
maintenance needs of the family. This
amount must—
(i) Be based on a reasonable assessment of their financial need;
(ii) Be adjusted for the number of
family members living in the home;
and
(iii) Not exceed the highest of the
following need standards for a family
of the same size:
(A) The standard used to determine
eligibility under the State's approved
AFDC plan.
(B) The standards used to determine
eligibility under the State's Medicaid
plan, as provided for in § 435.814.
(4) Amounts for incurred expenses
for medical or remedial care that are
not subject to payment by a third
party, including—
(i) Medicare and other health insurance premiums, deductibles, or coinsurance charges; and
(ii) Necessary medical or remedial
care recognized under State law but
not covered under the State's Medicaid plan, subject to reasonable limits
the agency may establish on amounts
of these expenses.
(d) In determining the amount of
the individual's income to be used to
reduce the agency's payment to the institution, the agency may,, for single
individuals, deduct an amount (in addition to the personal needs allowance) for maintenance of the individual's home if—
(1) The amount is deducted for not
more than a 6-month period; and
(2) A physician has certified that the
individual is likely to return to his
home within that period,
[45 PR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at
46 PR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 48 FR 5735,
Feb. 8, 1983]

42 C . F . R .
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§435.840 Medically needy resource
ards: General requirements.

To determine eligibility of me
needy individuals, a Medicaid
must use a resource standard
this subpart that is—
(a) Based on family size;
(b) Uniform for all individua
group; and
(c) Reasonable. (See § 435.841:
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 F3
Nov. 11, 1981]
§ 435.841 Medically needy resourc
ards: Reasonableness.

(a) The agency must use a m<
needy resource standard that
sonable, according to the provi*
this section.
(b) The following medically
resource standards are presume
reasonable:
(1) The agency provides one r
ly needy resource standard for
ered medically needy groups,
as provided in paragraph (c)
section, the standard must i
equal the highest resource s
used to determine eligibility
cash assistance programs rel
the covered medically needy gr
(2) The agency provides a d
medically needy resource stan<
each covered medically needj
Except as provided in paragrar.
this section, the standard for e
ered group must at least eq
highest resource standard use
termine eligibility in the casl
ance program related to that
medically needy group.
(c) In the case of an agency t
vides Medicaid for the aged, 1
disabled individuals only if th
more restrictive requiremen
used under SSI, the followin
sions apply:
(1) The agency may use a
standard for those individual
lower than the standard spe
paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) The lower standard musl
equal the medically needy
standard for those aged, blin<
abled individuals under the
plan on January 1, 1972.

§§ 4 3 5 . 8 4 0 - , 8 4 3

§ 435.851

Ith Care Financing Administration, HHS
i If the agency uses a medically
ly resource standard not specified
aragraphs (b) and (c) of this seeThat standard is not presumed to
asonable; and
HCPA must approve the stand-

(2) However, the amounts specified
in paragraph (e)(1) of this section
must be the same as those that would
be deducted in determining, under
§ 435.121, the eligibility of the categorically needy; and
(f) Apply the resource standards established under § 435.843.

R 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 PR 54743,
11, 1981]

[43 PR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 47989,
Sept. 30, 1981]

343 Medically needy resource standrds: State plan requirements.
The State plan must specify the
rce standard for each covered
jally needy group.
If the agency uses a resource
ard that is not presumed to be
liable under § 435.841, the State
nust describe that standard.
i 47989, Sept. 30, 1981]
IMINING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS
OF RESOURCES

45 Medically needy resource eligiity.
letermine eligibility on the basis
ources for medically needy indis, the agency m u s t consider only the individual's res and those that are considered
Die to him under the financial
isibility requirements for relain
§435.821, §435.822, or
23;
Consider only resources available
the period for which income is
ted under § 435.831(a);
or individuals under age 21 and
ter relatives, deduct the value of
:es that would be deducted in
lining eligibility under the
AFDC plan;
'or aged, blind, or disabled indiin States covering all SSI res, deduct the value of resources
juld be deducted in determining
ity under SSI;
) Por aged, blind, or disabled inis in States using requirements
estrictive than SSI, deduct the
)f resources in an amount no
estrictive than those deducted
he Medicaid plan on January 1,
id no more liberal than those
id in determining eligibility
SSI.

TREATMENT OF INCOME AND RESOURCES

§ 435.850 Treatment of income and resources: General requirements.
To determine eligibility of medically
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency
must use a methodology for the treatment of income and resources that is—
(a) Uniform for all individuals in a
covered group; and
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851).
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981]
§ 435.851 Treatment of income and resources: Reasonableness.
(a) The agency must use a methodology for the treatment of income and
resources, to determine eligibility of
the medically needy, that is reasonable.
(b) The methodology used to determine eligibility of individuals in the
cash assistance program related to the
covered medically needy group is presumed to be reasonable.
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid
for the aged, blind, or disabled individuals who meet more restrictive requirements than used under SSI, the
methodology for the treatment of
income and resources of those aged,
blind, or disabled individuals under
the State's plan on January 1, 1972, is
presumed to be reasonable.
(d) If the agency uses a methodology
not described in paragraphs (b) and (c)
of this section—
(1) The methodology is not presumed to be reasonable; and
(2) HCPA must approve that methodology.
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981]

42 C . F . R .
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have mailed four true and
correct copies of the above BRIEF OF PETITIONER to the
Attorneys for Respondent: DAVID L. WILKINSON, Attorney
General of Utah, at State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, and RUTH L. RENLUND, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114,
via First-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this *y
day
of <{uuryiP
, 1988.
lichael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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